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Using a panel of 260 Swedish municipalities over the period 1987-1996, this
paper investigates the direct displacement e¤ects of active labour market
programmes (ALMPs). Compared to earlier studies on this topic, we have
more and better data. From our GMM estimations, we …nd that (i) there
are direct displacement e¤ects from those ALMPs that generate subsidised
labour (in the order of approximately 65 percent), but there seems to be no
(signi…cant) displacement e¤ects from training, (ii) most ALMPs seem to
increase labour force participation, and (iii) the adjustment to the optimal
level of employment seems to be sluggish. A consequence of (ii) is that the
earlier studies have overstated the displacement e¤ects (since they normalised
with the labour force).
Key words: Labour market programmes, Displacement e¤ects, GMM es-
timation.
JEL Classi…cation: J31 Introduction
Much of the literature dealing with the evaluation of social programmes is pri-
marily concerned with the programme impacts for participants. Thus, most
evaluations of active labour market programmes (ALMPs) have focused on
the e¤ects on participants’ income or employment prospects. While certainly
of interest, these impacts at best only provide partial information on total
programme e¤ects. The obvious point in question is that many (if not most)
public programmes are likely to a¤ect also non-participants: taxes have to
be raised in order to …nance the programmes, wages for non-participants as
well as for participants may be a¤ected, and improved employment prospects
for participants may come at the cost of increased joblessness among non-
participants, so called displacement or crowding out.1 This latter e¤ect is
the subject of the present study.
During the recent Swedish recession, the number of participants in di¤er-
ent labour market programmes has reached an all times high.2 Roughly, these
programmes can be divided into training and subsidised employment. De-
spite the scale of the programmes, relatively little e¤ort has been put down on
programme evaluation. Consequently, relatively little is known about the ef-
fects even of major programmes.3 Regarding training programmes, displace-
ment e¤ects for non-participants probably is a minor issue. The few previous
studies dealing with displacement e¤ects of Swedish programmes involving
subsidised employment (Calmfors and Skedinger, 1995; Edin, Forslund, and
Holmlund, forthcoming 1999; Forslund, 1996; Forslund and Krueger, 1997;
Gramlich and Ysander, 1981; Ohlsson, 1995; Skedinger, 1995), however, indi-
cate that programme participants may indeed crowd out a substantial frac-
tion of regular jobs.4 These studies, though, with the exception of Forslund
(1996) and Edin, Forslund, and Holmlund (forthcoming 1999), either con-
sider measures which today are of smaller importance (typically relief work)
or cover time periods basically ending before or in the beginning of the recent
recession.
1The general issue of programme evaluation is discussed in Heckman and Smith (1998);
evaluation of labour market programmes is surveyed in Calmfors (1994) and Heckman,
LaLonde, and Smith (1998).
2In 1997, on average 191000 persons (4.5% of the labour force) participated in ALMPs,
excluding measures for the disabled. The part of the direct costs for this …nanced over the
budget of the central government amounted to 1.2% of GDP. See also Section 2.3 below.
3See, for example, the surveys in Björklund (1990) and Forslund and Krueger (1997).
4Similar results are found in a number of studies for other countries (Johnson and
Tomola, 1977; Nathan, Cook, and Rawlins, 1981; Adams, Cook, and Maurice, 1983; Kopits,
1978; Schmid, 1979). Casey and Bruche (1985) survey a number of studies and reach
similar conclusions.
1In this paper we endeavour to …ll out some of this lacuna by estimat-
ing displacement e¤ects of some Swedish ALMPs (relief work, training and
“other programmes”) using a panel of 260 Swedish municipalities for the
period 1987–1996.
Our main …ndings are that (i) there are direct displacement e¤ects from
those ALMPs that generates subsidised labour (in the order of approximately
65 percent), but there seems to be no (signi…cant) displacement e¤ects from
training, (ii) most ALMPs seem to increase labour force participation, and
(iii) adjustment to the optimal level of employment seems to be sluggish.
2 A brief overview of Swedish labour market
policy measures and the Swedish labour
market
The labour market policy measures considered in this study fall into two
broad categories: training and subsidised employment.5 Common to all mea-
sures is that they are administered at local labour o¢ces and that job search
through these o¢ces is a necessary condition for eligibility. The number of
di¤erent measures used over the years is vast, and here we limit ourselves to
a discussion of the measures of interest for this study.
2.1 Subsidised employment
Relief work, which has been part of Swedish ALMPs since at least the 1930s,
aims at counteracting cyclical and seasonal unemployment ‡uctuations. Only
tasks increasing employment in excess of the employer’s (central government,
municipality or private sector) regular budget are supposed to be subsidised.
The main part of the jobs is in the local public service sector. Relief jobs
normally last at most for six months and are paid according to collective
agreements. The subsidy amounts to at most 50% of wage costs or SEK
7000 per month.
Work experience schemes were introduced in the beginning of 1993 and
participants are, in order to avoid displacement, supposed to perform tasks
that would otherwise not have been performed. The measure is primarily
targeted at unemployed persons whose unemployment bene…ts are about to
expire. Compensation equals the unemployment bene…t and the duration is
5Due to limitations in data availability, we are not able to study all major programs.
The most notable example are recruitment subsidies and subsidised self employment.
2normally capped at six months. A large fraction of the programmes takes
place in the non-pro…t private sector.
Special youth measures, introduced in 1984, have taken a number of di¤er-
ent forms. In 1989contracted and special induction places replaced the earlier
so called youth teams. Both were targeted at youths at age 18-19. Contracted
induction places meant at most 60% wage subsidies for the private employer
hiring youths under the programme. Special induction places meant guar-
anteed temporary employment in the public sector for unemployed youth.
Induction places were in 1992 replaced by youth practice, targeted at youth
below age 25. The main idea of this programme was to provide the par-
ticipants with work experience and practice. The wage subsidy received by
the employer was well approximated by 100%; the participants received the
equivalent of the unemployment bene…t. As was the case with the work ex-
perience schemes, there was explicit mention of the need to avoid crowding
out of regular employment.
Practice for immigrants and practice for college graduates were used dur-
ing a short period in the mid 1990s. The number of participants was rather
limited in both programmes, and the construction was similar to that in
youth practice.
2.2 Training measures
The objectives of labour market training are to improve the position in the
labour market for workers with a short or obsolete education and to facilitate
for employers to …nd labour with the appropriate quali…cations. The level
of compensation received during training roughly coincides with the level of
unemployment bene…ts. Courses normally last for about 5 months. It is
worth noting that since the second half of the 1980s, participation in labour
market training can be used to acquire entitlement to a new period with
unemployment compensation.6
Trainee replacement schemes were introduced in 1991. This measure on
the one hand helps the employer to raise the quali…cation of the employees
and on the other hand helps the employment o¢ces to …nd temporary jobs
for the unemployed. Employers who use the measure get a reduction in
the payroll tax if they hire an unemployed worker as a replacement for an
employee undergoing training during her working time. The payroll tax
reduction was in 1997 less than or equal to SEK 350 a day or 50% of wage
costs. In addition, the employer receives assistance to …nance the training
(in 1997 at most SEK 40 per working hour and not more than SEK 20 000
6Unemployment compensation lasts for 14 months.
3per trainee).
2.3 The Swedish labour market and labour market
programmes
The Swedish rate of unemployment stayed virtually unchanged at around 2%
of the labour force between 1960 and 1990 with only rather modest cyclical
swings. This all changed in the early 1990s, when the unemployment rate
rapidly rose by more than six percentage points to almost 8% in 1993, see
Figure 1.7 From this perspective, our data, ranging between 1987 and 1996,
cover an exceptional period in the post-war Swedish labour market. This is
true also from the perspective of the development of ALMPs.
First, as is clearly visible in Figure 1, ALMP participation rose rapidly to
previously unmatched levels in the wake of the rise in unemployment. Second,
the programme mix was di¤erent than during previous recessions, partly due
to heavier reliance on training, partly because participation in some of the
“new” measures (work experience schemes and youth practice) rose rapidly.8
These features are clearly borne out by the panels in Figure 2, which illustrate
the monthly development of unemployment and labour market programmes
since the mid 1980s.9
To the extent that the displacement e¤ects of di¤erent programmes are
di¤erent, and to the extent that the e¤ects depend on labour market tight-
ness, there is, thus, a good case for studying displacement of ALMPs in the
1990s.
7This number is slightly lower than the “o¢cial” unemployment rate. The di¤erence
is due to the inclusion of ALMP participants in the labour force in the numbers plotted
in Figure 1. The sources are the following: Unemployment: Statistics Sweden, Labour
Force Surveys; The Labour force is generated as the sum of employment (Source: Statistics
Sweden, National Accounts), unemployment, training, youth programmes, work experience
schemes and workplace induction. Labour market programmes: National Labour Market
Board. The measures include relief work, training, youth programmes, recruitment subsi-
dies, work experience schemes, trainee replacement schemes and workplace induction.
8In earlier recessions, relief work was the measure of …rst resort to counteract downturns
in the Swedish labour market, see e.g. Ohlsson (1992).
9The unemployment series plotted is register data from the National Labour Market
Board and not based on the labour force surveys performed by Statistics Sweden. Par-
ticipation in youth programmes is not available at the municipality level prior to January
1987.









Figure 1: Unemployment (ur) and ALMPs (programr) 1960–1997 (share of
labour force)
3 Theoretical framework
To identify displacement e¤ects of ALMPs, a suitable counterfactual has to
be constructed to indicate how (regular) employment would have developed
absent the programmes or at other levels of programme participation. A
natural point of departure for this analysis is a version of the Layard-Nickell
model of the labour market (Layard and Nickell, 1986; Layard, Nickell, and
Jackman, 1991). In this model, both product- and labour markets are char-
acterised by imperfect competition.
The basic building blocs of the model are price- and wage-setting sched-
ules relating price setters’ mark-ups on wage costs and wage setters’ real-
wage decisions to (un)employment and other relevant variables. The original
model does not explicitly account for labour market programmes, but Calm-
fors (1994) demonstrates how the model can be used to analyse the e¤ects of
ALMPs. The addition of ALMPs warrants some modi…cations of the model:
…rst, as some participants are included among the employed10, a distinction
has to be made between employment and regular employment, excluding




































Figure 2: Unemployment and studied ALMPs 1983:1–1998:9
programme participants. Second, both price setting and wage setting will
generally depend on ALMPs.
3.1 The model
3.1.1 Wage setting
The general idea behind the wage-setting schedule can be derived from both
bargaining and e¢ciency-wage models. In this presentation we stick to a
bargaining framework. A positive relation between the probability of …nding
a new job for a laid-o¤ union member and the real wage follows in this
framework because the value of being laid o¤ increases in the probability of
…nding a new job.
In terms of observables, this line of reasoning under certain conditions
leads to a positive relation between the real wage rate and the employment
rate (Calmfors and Lang, 1995; Calmfors, 1994). To …x ideas, we can derive
a wage-setting relation such as the following:
w = f(n;u + r;°;X1) (1)
6where w is the product real wage rate, u unemployment-population ratio, r
the programme participation-population ratio, ° ´ r
r+u the fraction of jobless
in ALMPs and X1 a vector of other factors in‡uencing wage setting.11 We










A higher employment rate, ceteris paribus, means a higher probability for a
laid-o¤ worker to …nd a job, which in turn makes high wage demands less
costly for the union. The opposite is true for the sum of unemployment and
programme participation: more job seekers implies harder competition for
available jobs and a lower probability of re-employment for laid-o¤ union
members. Finally, the ambiguous sign on the e¤ect of the fraction of pro-
gramme participants of the jobless re‡ects two opposing forces. First, to the
extent that the value of being in a programme is greater than that of being
openly unemployed, we would expect the union to push for higher wages as
a result. Second, to the extent that programme participation contributes
to higher search e¢ciency among the jobless, this would imply harder job
competition for laid-o¤ workers and, thus, produce wage moderation.12
In our empirical analysis we use data for the Swedish municipalities. We
will assume that wage setting at this level is governed by something like
equation (1), with the proviso that a distinction has to be made between
local and aggregate labour market variables and that an “outside wage” is
one of the determinants of the value for a laid-o¤ worker.
3.2 Labour demand
In our measures of employment we could in principle make a distinction
between private sector employment and public sector employment. On the
other hand, we cannot observe the sectors of programme participants. Thus,
we will look at total employment at the municipality level. The determi-
nants of labour demand in the private and the public sectors are potentially
di¤erent, so we discuss them separately.
11This vector will typically include some measure of labour productivity and a tax-price
wedge between product and consumption wages. The wage-setting relation presented in
equation (1) is slightly non-standard in the sense that employment, unemployment and
programme participation are related to the population rather than to the labour force.
12See, for example, Calmfors and Lang (1995) or Forslund and Kolm (1999).
73.2.1 Private sector demand
To simplify the exposition, we derive a labour demand schedule for the private
sector under the assumption of perfect competition in the product market.13
Consider a competitive …rm producing a single homogeneous output (y) using
capital (K) and two categories of labour (N1 and N2) under constant returns
to scale. We let N1 denote employment of unsubsidised labour, whereas N2
represents subsidised employment.
We are …rst interested in …nding the response of labour demand to a
change in the price of subsidised labour.14 Analytically, this can be decom-
posed into two steps: …rst, we derive the optimal labour input at a given
level of output. Second, the optimal output level will generally depend on
factor prices. Thus, the response of optimal labour input to a change in the
subsidy of subsidised labour will be the sum of a substitution e¤ect at a given















where w2 is the price of subsidised labour.
To be more speci…c, we assume that the …rm’s technology can be repre-
sented by a generalised Leontief cost function15 exhibiting constant returns
to scale,










where bij = bji and w1 and w3 denote the price of unsubsidised labour and
capital, respectively. Using Shephard’s lemma, labour input is obtained by







13Qualitatively, little is changed if instead we assume imperfect product market compe-
tition and constant-elastic product demand.
14Unless the pre-subsidy compensation to subsidised labour changes proportionately to
the subsidy and in the opposite direction, increased subsidisation will give rise to a lower
cost per unit of subsidised labour to the …rm.
15The generalised Leontief cost function is a ‡exible functional form that can be seen
as a local second-order approximation to an arbitrary cost function, see Diewert (1974).
One of its characteristics is that it, in contrast to the CES function, does not impose any
restrictions on elasticities of substitution. The function can be generalised to include an
arbitrary number of inputs. Textbook treatments of labour demand using a generalised
Leontief speci…cation can be found in Berndt (1990) and Hamermesh (1993).
8Thus, for given output, the demand for labour depends on the parameters
of the technology (bij) and relative factor prices. The cross-price elasticity






b11 + b12(w2=w1)1=2 + b13(w3=w1)1=2: (6)
As the denominator is non-negative, the sign of the elasticity depends
on the sign of b12: For substitutes, this entity is positive. Furthermore, the
closer substitutes the two types of labour are, the larger the absolute value
of the elasticity is. For close substitutes at a given level of output, we would
consequently expect quite a large decline in the demand for unsubsidised
labour following a drop in the price of subsidised labour. Thus, for example,
to the extent that subsidised and unsubsidised youth labour are close sub-
stitutes, we would expect that youth programmes are likely to be associated
with substantial displacement of regular youth employment.
The Hicks-Allen (partial) elasticity of substitution for the generalised





where s1 and s2 are the factor shares of gross output of factor 1 and factor 2
respectively.
We now consider the scale e¤ect by looking at an industry of identical
…rms, each equipped with the same constant-returns technology. For the
whole industry, cost is given by
X
y
jc(w) ´ Y c(w); (8)
where w is the vector of factor prices, w = (w1;w2;w3): Using Shephard’s
lemma, industry demand for unsubsidised labour is given by
N1 = cw1(w)Y: (9)
In equilibrium, a zero-pro…t condition implies
p = c(w); (10)




9where the demand for industry output, Y d(p); (for simplicity) is assumed to
depend on the industry price only. Substituting equations (10) and (11) into
equation (9) gives aggregate demand for unsubsidised labour as
N1 = Y
d(c(w))cw1(w): (12)
To …nd the labour demand response to increased subsidisation, we di¤er-

























12 denotes the total cross-price elasticity, including the scale e¤ect; ´
the price elasticity of demand and "12 the cross-price elasticity at constant




12 = s2(´ + ¾12); (15)
where ¾12 is the Hicks-Allen partial elasticity of substitution. Thus, the
greater the share in output of subsidised labour, the greater the elasticity
of product demand and the greater the elasticity of substitution, the more
sensitive demand for unsubsidised labour is for subsidies to the subsidised
labour input.16 One implication of the …rst of these implications is that we
would, ceteris paribus, expect more displacement from expanding an already
large programme by a certain number of persons than from launching a new
programme involving the same number of persons.
In our data, we are not given the price of subsidised labour, but rather
the number of participants in di¤erent ALMPs.17 The question, then, is
how applicable the results regarding the e¤ects of changes in the rate of
subsidisation are for the analysis in terms of the e¤ects of the number of
programme participants on regular employment. One way of analysing this
would be to repeat the analysis above under an assumption that …rms are
16It is straightforward (but somewhat messy) to substitute the expressions for the factor
share and the elasticity of substitution obtained from the generalised Leontief function into
equation (15).
17In addition, we observe neither output nor capital stocks.
10forced to accept an exogenously given number of programme participants.
Without going through all steps, it can be shown that the cost function



























y + bN2N2: (17)
To be well-behaved, the cost function must be decreasing in N2; which
means that bN2 must be negative and hence regular employment decreasing
in the volume of subsidised labour. Generally speaking, the message from
equation (17) is that demand for regular labour will depend on all relative
factor prices of variable factors and (negatively) on the amount of subsidised
labour at a given level of output. On top of this, there will also be a scale
e¤ect of the kind discussed above.
Dynamics The framework outlined above is static. For a number of stan-
dard reasons we may expect employment to adjust sluggishly to its equilib-
rium level, in which case the previous analysis at most would be valid in
steady state equilibrium. Although it is straightforward to extend the anal-
ysis in such a direction by introducing various types of adjustment costs, we
will not do so.19 We will instead point to another extension that may be more
important in an analysis of the e¤ects of ALMPs. Consider an equilibrium
matching model of the Pissarides (1990) type. In such a framework “labour
demand” will manifest itself through …rms’ posting of vacancies. Vacancies
will be posted as long as they are associated with a non-negative pro…t. In
the presence of vacancy costs, the shorter the expected time to …ll a vacancy
is, the more vacancies it is pro…table to post. If one e¤ect of ALMPs is to
“lock in” potential job searchers, this will contribute to a longer expected du-
ration of vacancies, and hence to fewer vacancies. This, in turn, is equivalent
to an inward shift of labour demand.20
18See Hansson (1991), where a version of the Generalised Leontief cost function including
quasi-…xed inputs, generalising Diewert and Wales (1987), is presented.
19See, for example, Hansson (1991) or the analysis in Morrison (1988).
20See Calmfors and Lang (1995) and Calmfors (1994).
113.2.2 Municipal labour demand
If one sets out to investigate the displacement e¤ects of ALMPs on total em-
ployment, it might be important to recognise that most local governments
in the western world are large employers and hence constitute a large share
of total employment. This pattern is especially pronounced in the Scandina-
vian countries. In Sweden, for example, the total local government sector21
accounts for about 30% of total employment in the economy. The corre-
sponding …gure for the municipalities is about 20%, and wages and payroll
taxes constitute approximately 50% of municipal expenditures. This makes
the local governments in Sweden the largest single employer in the economy.
The fact that the local governments are such large employers constitutes
no problem as long as private and local government labour demand are gov-
erned by the same decision-making process. There are, however, reasons to
believe that other factors govern local government labour demand than pri-
vate sector labour demand. While a private company typically maximises a
pro…t function, the local governmentoutcome is typically determined through
a political process.22
Theoretical framework: Median voter model When studying the be-
haviour of local governments, individual preferences must somehow be trans-
lated into a single choice at the municipality level. Ever since Arrow formu-
lated the Impossibility Theorem, public …nance economists have been aware
of the fact that aggregating preferences is a tricky business. However, under
certain assumptions (e.g. single-peaked preferences, a single majority voting
system and a one-dimensional policy question (a single public service)) these
problems can be overcome. It turns out that, if these assumptions hold, the
winning proposal in a majority vote will be the proposal made by the voter
with the median position in preferences. This was …rst stated by Hotelling
(1929) and later developed by Bowen (1943) and Black (1958). The median
voter model has become the most common behavioural speci…cation used
when modelling the decision making process at the local government level,
and, to …x ideas, we will in this paper follow this tradition and base our
discussion on the median voter model.
Let us investigate the median voter’s optimisation problem in municipal-
ity i = 1;:::;M in time period t = 1;:::;T. The preferences of the median
21The total local government sector in Sweden is made up of the municipalities and the
counties. In this paper we focus our interest on the municipalities, whose main responsi-
bilities are day care, elderly care and schooling.
22So is, of course, also central government labour demand. It is, however, of such a
small magnitude that we do not analyse it here.
12voter are assumed to be captured by the function
Uit = U (Xit;eit;Zit); (18)
where U (¢) is a quasi-concave utility function, Xit a composite private good
(with a price normalised to one), eit = Eit=Nit per capita local public provi-
sion of a private good, and Zit is a vector of socio-economic characteristics.
The median voter maximises the utility function subject to two budget con-
straints (his or her individual budget constraint as well as the municipality’s
budget constraint) and the municipality’s production function. First, the
level of private consumption cannot exceed the median voter’s disposable
income
Xit = (1 ¡ tit)y
m
it; (19)
where tit is the local tax rate and ym
it the median voter’s (before tax) income.
Furthermore, maximisation is constrained by the municipality’s budget con-
straint
titNit¹ yit + Git = witN
d
it; (20)
where Nit is the number of inhabitants in municipality i in period t, ¹ yit the
mean individual (before tax) income, Git intergovernmental grants received
by the municipality, wit the wage rate received by individuals employed by
the municipality, and Nd
it municipal employment needed in order to supply
Eit.23 Solving equation (20) for the local tax rate, and substituting into










where git is intergovernmental grants per capita and ¿it =
ym
it
¹ yit is the tax
price paid by each median voter.24 The tax-price is to be interpreted as the
23Here we abstract from capital inputs and simply assume that the only input needed in
the supply of E is labour, that is, we assume that the production function takes the form
eit = f(nd
it) in per capita terms. This assumption is perhaps not too unrealistic having
the types of services municipalities supply in mind.
24There is a literature which claims that people employed by the municipality to a
larger extent vote for higher municipal expenditures than people not employed by the
municipality (see, e.g., Courant, Gramlich, and Rubinfeld (1979)). In relation to this it
might be noted that we assume that the median voter is not employed by the municipality,
an assumption which probably is ful…lled.
13marginal cost, in terms of increased tax payments, facing the individuals for
an additional unit of the publicly provided good. Substituting equation (21)





into the utility function (18) yields
the following maximisation problem
max
























Dynamics Earlier studies in the literature on local public expenditures in-
dicate some kind of dynamic behaviour of local governments (see, e.g., Holtz-
Eakin and Rosen (1991) on US data, Dahlberg and Johansson (1997; 1998)
on Swedish data, and Borge and Rattsø (1993; 1996) and Borge, Rattsø, and
Sørensen (1996) on Norwegian data). Incorporating dynamics into the me-
dian voter model is by no means easy, since the identity of the median voter
might change over time. An alternative is to introduce dynamics by combin-
ing the static median voter model with a partial adjustment rule. Since it is
likely that municipalities may not adjust labour freely, due to labour market
regulations and hiring costs, we would expect actual employment to devi-
ate from the one optimal in a static framework. Our dynamic formulation









for each year. The desired level of employment is determined by equa-
tion (23), whereas the relationship between the desired and the actual level
of employment is formulated as a partial adjustment process. The actual














The adjustment coe¢cient ¸; hence, measures the sluggishness of local
government responses to changing desired demand: the smaller the value of
¸, the stronger the sluggishness.
Substituting (23) into (24) yields actual employment as
n
d
it = ¸f (y
m
it;git;¿it;wit;zit) + (1 ¡ ¸)n
d
t¡1: (25)
143.2.3 Bergström, Dahlberg, and Johansson (1998)
In their study on municipal labour demand, Bergström, Dahlberg, and Jo-
hansson (1998) used the number of employed25 by the municipalities. Apart
from the key regressors given by the theoretical model (median income, in-
tergovernmental grants from the central government, the tax price (median
income over mean income), and the wage in the local public sector), they
used the following variables to capture the socio-economic structure in the
municipalities: Share of inhabitants younger than 16 years of age, share of
inhabitants older than 80 years of age, and a dummy variable capturing po-
litical preferences (taking the value of 1 whenever a municipality is governed
by a socialist local government, i.e. S + V constituting a majority, and zero
otherwise). It turned out that the demographic structure was an important
determinant of municipal labour demand, which is not surprising given the
types of services provided by the municipalities. Furthermore, they found
that the adjustment process was quite sluggish: only 60% of the desired
change in municipal employment was implemented during the …rst year.
3.3 Direct displacement
Let us now return to the issue of direct displacement e¤ects of ALMPs.
We have discussed the wage-setting relation as well as labour demand. We
have not, however, clari…ed the issue of what should be considered direct
displacement and how, in principle, it could be measured. To achieve this,
we use a …gure from Calmfors (1994), which is a graphical illustration of the
ALMP-adapted Layard-Nickell model discussed above.
In Figure 3, the real wage is measured along the vertical axis and the
regular employment rate (share of the working age population) is measured
along the horizontal axis. In accordance with the discussion in Section 3.1.1
we expect the wage rate to increase in the regular employment rate, illus-
trated by the positively sloped WS (Wage Setting) schedule. The vertical FE
line corresponds to full employment, here for simplicity assumed to be inde-
pendent of the wage rate. The distance between the FE line and the RR line
corresponds to the proportion of the working age population participating
in ALMPs (the distance r). The negatively sloped line (RES) is the regular
employment schedule, indicating the demand for unsubsidised labour. Equi-
librium obtains at the intersection of the WS and RES schedules, where
wage-setting and employment decisions are consistent. In the absence of
ALMPs, the fraction u + r would be openly unemployed in equilibrium, but
ALMPs take the fraction r out of open unemployment.







Figure 3: Modi…ed Layard-Nickell model
The volume of regular employment is the outcome of decisions in both
the private and the public sector. One of the upshots of the discussion in
Sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 is a prediction that both private and public sector
demand in terms of the number of persons will depend negatively on the real
wage rate. In principle, there is no complication involved in expressing labour
demand in per capita form instead, as in Figure 3, as long as all “numbers”
of persons are turned into the same per capita form.26
26There is, however, a complication related to the empirical analysis. Our prime in-
terest is in the number of persons crowded out of regular employment by ALMP par-
ticipants. We employ data for the Swedish municipalities. To the extent that ALMPs
a¤ect inter-municipality migration, relating employment and programme participation to
the municipality population may produce biased estimates of the number of persons dis-
placed. These considerations lead us to use the lagged population instead of the current
as our main alternative in the estimations.
16We want to make a distinction between direct and indirect displace-
ment, where the latter is displacement resulting from any wage-raising e¤ects
ALMPs may have. Thus, direct displacement is here de…ned as any displace-
ment that takes place at a given real wage. Our approach in the empirical
work is to condition on our wage measure, and interpret estimated employ-
ment changes conditional on the real wage as shifts in the RES schedule.
Consequently, estimated employment e¤ects of ALMPs at a given real wage
will be our empirical measure of direct displacement.
3.3.1 Expected employment e¤ects of di¤erent ALMP measures
What, if anything, do we expect about the ALMP e¤ects on regular em-
ployment against the background of the description of the di¤erent labour
market programmes and labour demand in the private and the public sector?
We look at this issue by programme. First, however, there is one impor-
tant caveat to notice. Ideally, given information on participation by sector,
we could estimate sector-speci…c displacement for the di¤erent programmes.
Such information is, however, available only on an ad hoc basis. Due to this,
we are obliged to estimate aggregate employment relations.
Relief work Since relief workers perform ordinary work and are paid ac-
cording to collective agreement, and the wage subsidy is at most 50%, we
would expect this set-up to generate crowding out. Displacement e¤ects
are also found in previous empirical work by Gramlich and Ysander (1981),
Forslund and Krueger (1997) and Forslund (1996), where the two former
studies …nd signi…cant displacement in building and construction (but not
in health care, day care and care for the elderly) and the latter …nds overall
crowding out.
Training Persons undergoing training are not supposed to work, so we
would not expect (signi…cant) displacement. There are, however, some in-
dications that trainees actually have been performing regular work.27 In
addition, to the extent that training locks in potential job seekers, we would
expect fewer vacancies to be announced, and hence employment to be lower,
see Section 3.2.1. Forslund (1996) …nds some indication of crowding out
e¤ects of training.
27This seems to have been the case with training in newly established …rms or in training
in connection with the expansion of …rms, where an analysis by the National Labour
Market Board (AMS, 1996) indicates that trainees have performed regular duties. One
might speculate that this kind of abuse became more likely in connection with the very
rapid expansion of training programmes in the early 1990s.
17Youth programmes Most types of youth programmes have given employ-
ers access to free or cheap young workers. Although, if one goes by the book,
the programme rules have stipulated some training content, survey results
seem to imply that the programmes to some extent have been viewed as
“free labour” with little training content (Hallström, 1994; Schröder, 1995).
Skedinger (1995), Forslund (1996) and Edin, Forslund, and Holmlund (forth-
coming 1999) …nd strong evidence that youth measures crowd out regular
employment, especially regular youth employment.
Work experience schemes Participants in work experience schemes are
supposed to perform tasks that would otherwise not have been performed,
and a large fraction of the programmes have taken place in the private non-
pro…t sector. Taken at face value, these properties of the programme would
point to limited displacement e¤ects. On the other hand, the programme
expanded very rapidly and there may be some doubts about the possibilities
for employment o¢cers to implement the programme as planned against this
background (Hallström, 1995). Forslund (1996) found some displacement
e¤ects of the programme, although smaller than the ones found for relief
work and youth programmes.
Trainee replacement schemes Trainee replacement schemes may give
rise to displacement e¤ects to the extent that the employers (mainly munici-
palities) using the programme have let the “replacing” worker perform duties
that would otherwise have been performed by somebody else than the person
replaced (the trainee). This could be the case if, for instance, the trainee is
training to become a nurse because of risk of losing a job as a nurse’s as-
sistant. The point estimate in Forslund (1996) indicated 40% displacement,
but the e¤ect was very imprecisely estimated.
Workplace induction Workplace induction resembles both relief work
and youth programmes (which the programme replaced in 1996) a lot, and,
consequently, we expect this measure to be associated with similar e¤ects as
those programmes.
Practice for immigrants, practice for college graduates The set-up
of practice for immigrants and practice for college graduates is very similar
to that of youth practice, and, hence, we expect them to be similar with
respect to displacement e¤ects.
In the empirical analysis we use relief work and training separately and
combine the other …ve programme groups into one group (which we label
18“other programmes”).
4 Regional allocation of ALMP expenditures
As a background to the econometric speci…cation of displacement models,
a brief discussion of the allocation of grants for ALMPs is useful. The
discussion here is based on the principles during the …scal year 1994/95
(AMS, 1994). First, a discretionary decision about the total size of spending
on ALMPs is taken by the central government, which also lays down the legal
framework for the di¤erent policy measures. This has meant that the menu
of available policy measures has been decided at the central level, although
the system has become more decentralised in this respect over the past few
years. Occasionally, targets for the total volumes of di¤erent programmes
are also speci…ed by the central government.28
Given total spending, the National Labour Market Board decides how to
allocate grants over regional labour market authorities at the county level.
This is done according to a number of principles. First, total expenditure
is split into two equally sized parts, “basic grants” and “market determined
grants”. In a second stage these two categories of grants are further allocated
in the following way: 10% of the basic grants is distributed equally over the 24
counties and another 10% between 111 local labour markets. The rest of the
basic grants is distributed according to population in ages 16–64. The market
determined grants are allocated by county mainly according to the number
of job seekers in the county in the previous …scal year (openly unemployed
and ALMP participants), but also according to a summary measure of the
service level of the employment service.29
If we translate this into ALMP spending per capita in ages 16–64, the
principles above imply that such spending will be increasing both in past
unemployment and past ALMP participation. Thus, given the level of total
spending on ALMPs, past unemployment and past total ALMP participa-
tion in a county would be suitable instruments for total county spending on
ALMPs. What we have in our model is, however, the number of persons in
di¤erent policy programmes at the municipality level. We are not aware of
formalised rules determining spending within counties of the same kind as
28This has, for example, been the case over the past few years, when a central policy
objective of the government has been to reduce open unemployment to half its mid 1990s
level.
29To be precise, the weights are the following: Population share: .4; County share:
.05; Local labour markets: .05; In‡ow of job seekers*(in‡ow of unemployed persons as a
fraction of the labour force): .4; In‡ow of job seekers*service level factor: .1.
19between counties. We would, however, suspect that similar factors determine
allocation over municipalities as over counties.
5 The data
5.1 Data sources and sample selection
Our data derive from two basic sources: A register from Statistics Sweden
(ÅRSYS) provides information on employment by industry, age group and
municipality, associated annual labour incomes, also by industry, age group
and municipality and population by age group and municipality. This regis-
ter is available from 1985 and the employment and population …gures refer
to November each year. Information on ALMP participation and unemploy-
ment has been collected from sources at the National Labour Market Board,
where it has been made available on a monthly basis. For relief work and
labour market training, data go back to before 1985. For the rest of the
programmes, with the exception of youth programmes, subsidised self em-
ployment and recruitment subsidies, we have data from the point in time at
which they have been introduced. For recruitment subsidies, which were in-
troduced in 1983(?), and for subsidised self employment, we have no informa-
tion before 1995. Thus, these programmes are excluded from our analysis.30
For youth programmes, our information goes back to 1987. This de…nes the
starting point for our analysis.
Due to the creation of new municipalities during the period under study,
a number of municipalities have been dropped.31 Furthermore, some munic-
ipalities that had missing observations on relief work were dropped.32 This
leaves us with a balanced panel of 260 municipalities per year for a ten-year
period, from 1987 to 1996.33 We see no a priori reason to believe that this
attrition is systematic with respect to the displacement e¤ects of ALMPs
and, thus, no reason to expect selection bias.
30Of course, we would have liked to include these programmes. On the other hand, their
quantitative importance has been limited.
31The municipalities dropped for this reason are 461 (Gnesta), 488 (Trosa), 480
(Nyköping), 1535 (Bollebygd), and 1814 (Lekeberg). Gnesta and Trosa were created in
1992. They were earlier parts of Nyköping. Bollebygd and Lekeberg were created in 1994.
32The municipalities dropped for this reason are 128, 184, 187, 486, 512, 563, 582, 686,
1137, 1162, 1163, 1484, 1527, 1561, 1562, 1622, 1643, 1760, 2029, 2403, 2409, 2462, and
2463.
33This is …ve more years than in the studies by Forslund (1996) and Sjöstrand (1997).
They used data for the time period 1990-1994.
205.2 De…nitions of variables
The basic measure of employment is the number of employed persons less the
number of those employed in such ALMPs that are recorded as employed in
the employment statistics (relief workers and participants in trainee replace-
ment schemes). The natural variable to use is the number of persons. The
municipalities are, however, very far from equally sized, so we have decided
to normalise the number of employed persons by the municipal working-age
population (ages 18 – 65) in our baseline estimates. The same normalisation
is applied to participation in ALMPs. An alternative would be to instead
normalise by the municipal labour force. The drawback with this latter nor-
malisation is that, to the extent ALMPs increase labour force participation,
we would get an upward biased estimate of the number of persons crowded
out by the programmes. The same problem is present to some extent also
regarding the working-age population to the extent that programme partici-
pation a¤ects migration. However, we judge this problem to be less serious.
Nevertheless, we use the one year lagged population rather than the current
level in our baseline estimations.
From the exposition in Section 3.2 it is clear that we need a measure
of the wage rate for unsubsidised labour. Unfortunately, there is no wage
rate available at the municipal level, so we have had to settle for the average
annual labour income among those employed by municipality instead. As
we will (primarily) exploit the time series variation in the data by estimat-
ing …xed e¤ects models, our main concern is that there may be systematic
variations over time and municipalities in working time.34
Data on programme participation is available on a monthly basis, whereas
employment is measured in November each year. The measures of ALMPs
used in the estimations are computed as 12-month averages running from
November the year before until October the current year. We have done
so to remedy (at least partially) the obvious simultaneity problem arising
because the volume of programmes depends on the labour market situation
and, hence, on employment.
In the baseline estimations we have put the ALMP measures in three
categories: relief work, training and other programmes. Basically, this cate-
gorisation is based upon the fundamental distinction between subsidised em-
ployment and training. The reason to single out relief work from other kinds
of subsidised employment is that it, among the programmes we consider, is
most similar to regular employment. Participants are not supposed to un-
dergo training or receive practice: they are supposed to work and receive
34Trends in working hours that are common across municipalities is no problem, because
such variation is caught by the time dummies we use in the estimations.
21Variable De…nition
n (employed-relief work-trainee replacement schemes)/pop1865
INCOME average labour income among those employed (proxy for wages)
RELIEF WORK average number of persons in relief work/pop1865
TRAINING average number of persons in training/pop1865
OTHER PROGR. (workplace induction+practice for immigrants
+practice for college graduates
+work experience schemes
+trainee replacement schemes+youth programmes)/pop1865
DEMAND labour demand proxy/pop1865
Table 1: Variable de…nitions
compensation according to collective wage agreements. It is also interest-
ing to compare the estimated e¤ects of relief work to those found in earlier
studies.
Although it would be preferable to study the impact of every single pro-
gramme, there are compelling reasons not to do so. First, the number of
programmes is vast, especially in the 1990s, and many programmes have
been used for quite a short while. Second, we see no natural way to …nd
instruments for the allocation of persons between a large number of pro-
grammes. We may even have gone too far in this respect by looking at three
categories of programmes.
As another measure toremedy simultaneity problems, we have constructed
a proxy for municipality-speci…c demand shocks. This measure is constructed
using a two-digit industry breakdown of employment by municipality. Given
this information about the structure of employment, we construct the de-
mand index as the change in employment that would obtain between two
years given that a municipality had the same employment development by
industry as the national change in employment by industry.35
We summarise the de…nitions of the variables used in the empirical anal-
ysis in Table 1. Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 9 in the ap-
pendix.36
35The variable corresponds closely to the output term in equation (17).
36pop1856 is the population in ages 18–65 in the previous year.
226 Results
6.1 Dynamic model
As we have reasons to suspect both simultaneity problems and measurement
errors, we will estimate the model by instrumental variables (IV) methods.
Furthermore, time aggregation and sluggish adjustment to the optimal level
of employment (due to, e.g., hiring and …ring costs) call for some dynamic
speci…cation. Therefore, following the discussions in sections 3.2 and 3.3,
our starting point for an empirical speci…cation is a dynamic model given by
nit = ®t + ¸nit¡1 + ¯
0Pit + °
0Xit + fi + "it; (26)
where i denotes municipalities, t years, nit employment, ®t is a time dummy,
Pit a vector of labour market programmes (i.e.,RELIEF WORK, TRAIN-
ING, and OTHER PROGR.), X a vector of independent variables other
than the labour market programmes (i.e., INCOME37 and DEMAND), fi a
municipality-speci…c e¤ect that does not vary over time, "it is a white noise
error term, and ¸; ¯ and ° are parameters to be estimated.
When estimating equation (26), we will use the generalised method of
moments (GMM) estimator developed by Arellano and Bond (1991).38 For
the results we present in the main analysis, we use variables in levels (i.e.
not logged) and normalised with the population aged 18-65, lagged one year,
for the years 1987-1996.
6.1.1 GMM
The results from the GMM estimation of equation˜ (26) are presented in Ta-
ble 2.39 In addition to lags of the variables included in equation (26), we
37To be as consistent with the theory laid out in Section 3.2.1 as possible, we will use
the square root of the income variable.
38In addition to simultaneity problems and measurement errors, the use of an IV esti-
mator is needed as OLS in the presence of a lagged dependent variable on the right hand
side produces biased estimates (Nickell, 1981).
39Notes to Table 2: i) The GMM estimates were obtained using DPD for Ox 2.00.
For a description of the programs, see Doornik (1998) and Doornik, Arellano, and Bond
(1999); ii) Standard errors are computed using the asymptotic standard errors, which are
obtained using a heteroscedasticity-robust estimator of the variance-covariance matrix;
iii) The AR(1) - AR(2) tests are reported as the test statistics for …rst- and second or-
der serial correlation in the residuals in …rst di¤erences in the GMM2 estimation. These
statistics are each supposed to be asymptotically standard normal under the null of no
serial correlation; iv) A constant and time dummies are included in all regressions; v)
23use three additional variables as instruments. First, we use the unemploy-
ment rate, here measured as the average number of unemployed persons
during the last 12 months normalised with the working-age population, in
earlier periods. This follows from the details of the allocation of spending on
ALMPs in Section 4: against this background it seems reasonable to assume
that today’s level of programme participation is a function of yesterday’s
unemployment rates. Second, we use a variable characterising the political
majority in the municipal council (POLITICAL MAJORITY).40 The idea is
that parties with di¤erent ideological preferences push for the use of active
labour market programmes to di¤erent extents. Third, we use tax equalising
grants that the municipality receives from the central government. The level
of these grants is a function of a municipality’s tax base in the current and
in earlier periods, and since the municipalities’ tax base in Sweden is almost
entirely made up of labour income41, it seems reasonable to assume that to-
day’s level of program participation is a function of today’s and yesterday’s
tax base.42
Turning to the estimation results, we can …rst note that the Sargan test
rejects instrument validity/model speci…cation in …rst step (Sargan(1)) but
that instrument validity/model speci…cation cannot be rejected in second
step (Sargan(2)). Further note that we reject absence of …rst order serial
correlation in the residuals (AR(1) is signi…cant), but that we cannot reject
the absence of second order serial correlation (AR(2) is not signi…cant). This
Sargan(1) (Sargan(2)) gives the p-value of the Sargan test of the over-identifying restric-
tions (validity of instruments) in the GMM1 (GMM2) estimation. Under the null of valid
instruments, the Sargan statistic is asymptotically distributed as chi-squared with (p-k)
degrees of freedom, where p is the number of moment conditions and k is the number
of coe¢cients estimated; vi) The set of instruments includes; political majority and tax
equalising grants (both in …rst-di¤erence form), n (in levels, lags 3-6); INCOME, UNEM-
PLOYED, RELIEF WORK, TRAINING, OTHER PROGR., and DEMAND (in levels,
lags 1-6); the constant and the time dummies.
40POLITICAL MAJORITY = 1 if the municipal council is run by a socialist majority,
0 otherwise. The use of this kind of instrument is suggested by Calmfors and Skedinger
(1995).
41In Sweden, approximately 99% of the taxes raised at the municipal level derive from
income taxation.
42For the results presented in the paper, we have used a maximum of six lags on the
instrumental variables. We have estimated models where we have had everything from a
maximum of …ve lags to all available lags. The results are very stable over these di¤erent
speci…cations (both in terms of speci…cation tests and in terms of coe¢cient estimates).
The most notable exception is that the Sargan test rejects the model speci…cation when
we have a maximum of four lags. In accordance with theory, the AR(1) tests always
rejects the null while we with the AR(2) tests never can reject the null at a …ve percent
signi…cance level. The estimation results for these di¤erent speci…cations are available
upon request.
24is in accordance with theory.43 The test results thus indicate that we shall
rely on the second step estimates.
All independent variables are signi…cant, even though some care must
be taken for TRAINING since it is insigni…cant in the …rst step and there
is evidence that the estimated standard errors are downward biased in the
second step.44 The same goes for RELIEF WORK, which is only signi…cant
at the ten percent level in the …rst step. The lagged dependent variable
has a point estimate of 0.15 and is statistically signi…cant, indicating that
it is important to control for dynamics. The sign of the e¤ect of INCOME
is opposite of the expected if the variable is interpreted as a proxy for the
wage. An alternative interpretation may be that the variable instead serves
as a measure of the size of the municipality tax base, in which case the model
in Section 4.2.2 predicts a positive relation between INCOME and labour
demand by the municipality. The point estimates indicate that the short-
run displacement e¤ect from RELIEF WORK is 0.64, from TRAINING 0.16,
and from OTHER PROGR. 0.66.
GMM1 GMM2
Variable Coe¤ SE t-ratio Coe¤ SE t-ratio
nt¡1 0.151 0.059 2.581 0.151 0.009 17.437
INCOMEt¡1 0.007 0.001 4.919 0.007 2.350e-4 31.461
RELIEF WORK -0.661 0.382 -1.728 -0.639 0.043 -15.023
TRAINING -0.188 0.143 -1.312 -0.160 0.022 -7.317
OTHER PROGR: -0.647 0.159 -4.072 -0.658 0.018 -37.610
DEMAND 0.243 0.049 4.982 0.245 0.007 35.097
Sargan(1) AR(1) AR(2) Sargan(2) AR(1) AR(2)
Test 624.46 -6.914 1.512 228.79 -7.842 1.532
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.131 0.399 0.000 0.126
Table 2: GMM estimation of the dynamic model
The long run displacement e¤ects for the estimates in Table 2 are given
in Table 3.45 From Table 3 we see that the displacement e¤ects of all three
43The estimator assumes absence of serial correlation in the model in levels form. If
this is so, getting rid of the …xed e¤ects by …rst-di¤erencing will induce an MA(1) error
term. This will show up as negative …rst order serial correlation and absence of second
order serial correlation.
44See, for example, the analysis in Bergström, Dahlberg, and Johansson (1997).
45The long run e¤ects were derived by assuming a steady state where all variables assume
constant values. The standard errors for the long run displacement e¤ects were obtained
by applying the delta-method and using the second step estimates.
25labour market programmes are (signi…cantly) higher in the long run com-
pared with the short run. The result that displacement e¤ects are larger (in
absolute terms) in the long run contradicts the results in Forslund (1996).
He ends up with displacement e¤ects that are smaller in the long run, a phe-
nomenon he …nds di¢cult to explain. One explanation might be that he had
too few time periods to properly identify the long run properties.
Variable Coe¢cient SE
RELIEF WORK -0.756 0.047
TRAINING -0.188 0.025
OTHER PROGR -0.774 0.018
Table 3: Estimated long-run e¤ects
6.2 Static model
To get a broader picture, it can be interesting to see some estimation results
for the static model. Following the discussion in Section 3.3, our empirical
speci…cation of the static model is given by
nit = ®t + ¯Pit + °Xit + fi + ²it (27)
with the same notation as in equation (26).
We estimate equation (27) by using ordinary least squares (OLS), the
…xed e¤ect estimator (FE), and the GMM estimator proposed by Arellano
and Bond (1991). The estimation results are presented in Table 4.46 Let us
begin by assuming that the f0s in equation (27) are equal for all municipal-
ities. Applying OLS on pooled data yields the results in the …rst column
of Table 4. The results indicate severe displacement e¤ects; relief work, ac-
cording to the point estimates crowd out well in excess of 100% and even
training is estimated to (signi…cantly) crowd out as much as 48% of regular
employment. To investigate to what extent this is a result of imposing equal
f0s, we next turn to …xed-e¤ects estimates.
Estimating equation (27) by means of the within estimator (hence assum-
ing that there exists municipality-speci…c …xed e¤ects), yields the results in
the second column of Table 4. When allowing for …xed e¤ects, the displace-
ment e¤ect of training is approximately the same, while the displacement
46Time dummies and a constant were included in all regressions in Table 4. An asterisk
denotes signi…cance at the …ve percent level. For the GMM results, see the notes to
Table 2.
26e¤ect of relief work is signi…cantly lower and the displacement e¤ect of other
programmes is signi…cantly higher.47
The …xed e¤ects estimator requires that all the independent variables are
exogenous. Whether this is the case can be tested by means of a Hausman
test, testing the null of exogenous regressors. Under the null, the …xed e¤ect
estimator is consistent and e¢cient, but under the alternative it is inconsis-
tent. A GMM estimator is consistent under both the null and the alternative.
Carrying out the test (using the GMM estimator suggested by Arellano and
Bond (1991)), we obtained a test statistic of 22978 (with 13 degrees of free-
dom), which clearly rejects the null. Having rejected exogeneity, it is not
possible to use the regular …xed e¤ect estimator. We therefore turn to the
GMM technique. The GMM results are presented in the last columns of
Table 4. The test results indicate that we shall rely on the second step esti-
mates. If we compare with the results in the …rst two columns, we can note
that the point estimates for RELIEF WORK and OTHER PROGR. lies in
between the OLS and …xed e¤ects estimates: taken at face value, the GMM
estimates indicate that relief work crowd out 98% and other programmes
75%. The most dramatic change is though for TRAINING, where the point
estimate drops to -0.17 and is insigni…cant in the …rst step.
6.3 Time-varying coe¢cients
Given the rapid changes in the Swedish labour market between the 1980s
and the 1990s brie‡y described in Section 2.3, it would not seem far fetched
that the employment responses to ALMPs may have changed. This could be
so both because the total number of job searchers and programme partici-
pants increased dramatically and because the programme mix changed sub-
stantially. Hence, we have re-estimated the dynamic model (equation (26)),
allowing the parameters associated with the e¤ect of programmes to vary
between the years to see how the parameter estimates for the labour market
programmes evolve over time. These estimates are presented in Figure 4.48
Looking at Figure 4, we see that relief work seems to crowd out in the
beginning of the period and crowd in during the later years. Training, on
47The assumption of random e¤ects was rejected by a Hausman test. The Â2-distributed
test statistic was 486.3 with 12 degrees of freedom. Furthermore, when testing the signif-
icance of the …xed e¤ects, the null of pooling was clearly rejected (F(259,2048) = 4.628).
Time dummies and a constant were included in the regression.
48In these estimations, the coe¢cients for INCOME and DEMAND where assumed to
be constant over the years. Since we cannot reject the model speci…cation when restricting
the coe¢cients to have the same e¤ects over time, one shall interpret the point estimates
of the time-varying coe¢cients carefully. The interesting thing to note from Figure 4 is
rather the general time pattern for the di¤erent ALMPs.
27OLS FE GMM1 GMM2
Variable Coef. (SE) Coef. (SE) Coef. (SE) Coef(SE)
INCOMEt¡1 -5.08e-04* -.005* 0.008* 0.008*
(1.15e-04) (2.72e-04) (0.002) (1.91e-04)
RELIEF WORK -1.157* -.696* -0.981* -0.966*
(.136) (.179) (0.381) (0.045)
TRAINING -.480* -.450* -0.198 -0.174*
(.064) (.077) (0.153) (0.021)
OTHER PROGR -.642* -.935* -0.742 -0.757*
(.063) (.073) (0.159) (0.013)
DEMAND .979* .618* 0.313* 0.315*
(.009) (.019) (0.039) (0.005)
Sargan (p-value) 685.64 228.68
(0.000) (0.419)
AR(1) (p-value) -7.488 -7.455
(0.000) (0.000)
AR(2) (p-value) 0.740 0.730
(0.459) (0.466)
Table 4: Estimation results for static model
the other hand, seems to have had approximately the same displacement
e¤ects during the whole period (which, it seems, is more or less equivalent
to no e¤ect). The other programmes, …nally, seem to have been crowding
out regular employment during the whole studied period, with rather severe
displacement e¤ects in the beginning of the period.
6.4 Comparisons with earlier work on Swedish data
Löfgren and Wikström (1997) raise two major concerns with earlier Swedish
studies on direct displacement e¤ects of active labour market programmes.
First, they point out that there were too few time periods for the estimation
of a dynamic model (…ve years) and, second, they have some worries about
the consequences of the normalisation by the labour force used by Forslund
(1996) (they suggest normalisation by the population instead). While the
…rst concern might be a real problem, the second one concerns more how to
interpret the model. This issue will be further explored below, when we set
out to investigate what e¤ects these concerns might have had on the results.
To examine how the …rst point raised by Löfgren and Wikström (1997)













































Figure 4: Estimated displacement e¤ects of relief work, training and other
programmes 1989–96
only the years 1990–1994, which is the time period used by Forslund (1996)
and Sjöstrand (1997). The normalisation is made by the population in the
last period. The results are presented in Table 5.49 The …rst thing to note is
that it is very di¢cult to get a well-speci…ed model for this shorter time pe-
riod. The Sargan statistic rejects the null of valid instruments/correct model
speci…cation (which is true for all model speci…cations we have tried, in-
cluding, e.g., di¤erent lag lengths on the instruments, di¤erent combinations
of the instruments used in …rst-di¤erenced and in levels form respectively,
and with lags on the other right-hand side variables apart from the lagged
dependent variable). This implies that the results are unreliable, and that
interpretation must be taken with care. What we see is that most variables
are insigni…cant even in the second step (i.e., even though the standard er-
rors are downward biased in that step). This is, for example, the case for the
49The set of instruments includes political majority and tax equalising grants (both
in …rst-di¤erence form), n (in levels, lags 3-6); INCOME, UNEMPLOYED, RE-
LIEF WORK, TRAINING, OTHER PROGR.and DEMAND (in levels, lags 1-6); the
constant and the time dummies. See further notes to Table 2.
29lagged dependent variable, which it also is in Forslund’s (1996) estimation of
the dynamic model. A tentative conclusion from these results is hence that it
is not suitable to estimate a dynamic labour demand model for such a short
time period as …ve years.
GMM1 GMM2
Variable Coe¤ SE t-ratio Coe¤ SE t-ratio
nt¡1 0.151 0.090 1.690 0.085 0.066 1.293
INCOMEt¡1 0.001 0.003 0.423 0.002 0.002 0.899
RELIEF WORK 0.615 0.838 0.734 0.753 0.552 1.365
TRAINING -0.009 0.218 -0.042 0.080 0.149 0.535
OTHER PROGR: -0.196 0.270 -0.725 -0.026 0.187 -0.138
DEMAND 0.146 0.087 1.683 0.232 0.069 3.350
Sargan(1) AR(1) AR(2) Sargan(2) AR(1) AR(2)
Test 116.87 -4.135 0.026 74.034 -4.360 -0.134
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.979 0.015 0.000 0.893
Table 5: GMM estimation of the dynamic model for the time period 1990-
1994 (e¤ective years of estimation: 1992-1994)
To examine how Löfgren and Wikström’s second point might have af-
fected the earlier results presented here, we re-estimate equation (26) instead
normalised with the labour force. These results are presented in Table 650.
Before proceeding, it can be worth stressing that this point is not so much
concerned with “right” and “wrong” as with di¤erent types of interpretations.
If ALMPs increase labour force participation per se, we would, when nor-
malising with the labour force, by de…nition get parameter estimates of the
ALMPs that indicate more crowding out of regular employment than if the
normalisation is made with the population. That is, if we get more crowding
out when normalising with the labour force than when normalising with the
population, this is consistent with ALMPs actually increasing labour force
participation. However, even though the normalisation was made with the
labour force in the earlier studies, this point was never discussed: the pa-
rameter estimates were only interpreted in terms of displacement e¤ects. Of
course, this also means that if one is only interested in the “pure” displace-
ment e¤ects of ALMPs, one shall normalise with the population.
From the results in Table 6, it can …rst be noted that the estimated co-
e¢cients for TRAINING and OTHER PROGR. are signi…cantly larger (in
50The set of instruments includes: n (in levels, lags 3-7); INCOME and UNEMPLOYED
(in levels, lags 2-7); RELIEF WORK, TRAINING, OTHER PROGR., and DEMAND (in
levels, lags 1-7); the constant and the time dummies. See further notes to Table 2
30absolute terms) when normalising with the labour force (¡0:81 compared to
¡0:16 for TRAINING and ¡1:25 compared to ¡0:66 for OTHER PROGR.).
The parameter estimate for relief work is now positive, but clearly insignif-
icant in the …rst step. These results indicate that the mere existence of
training and other labour market programmes increases labour force partici-
pation, while it is less clear what e¤ects relief work has in this respect. It can
also be noted that the coe¢cient for the lagged dependent variable is now
insigni…cant at the …ve percent signi…cance level in the …rst step estimates.
This is in accordance with Forslund (1996), who also gets an insigni…cant co-
e¢cient for the lagged dependent variable when normalising with the labour
force.
GMM1 GMM2
Variable Coe¤ SE t-ratio Coe¤ SE t-ratio
nt¡1 0.044 0.050 0.873 0.043 0.009 5.078
INCOMEt¡1 0.004 0.002 2.284 0.003 3.48e-04 9.993
RELIEF WORK 0.139 0.270 0.516 0.146 0.023 6.390
TRAINING -0.819 0.118 -6.963 -0.809 0.017 -47.465
OTHER PROGR: -1.247 0.151 -8.283 -1.248 0.024 -52.860
DEMAND 0.194 0.022 8.837 0.192 0.003 65.270
Sargan(1) AR(1) AR(2) Sargan(2) AR(1) AR(2)
Test 865.27 -6.199 -1.853 240.99 -7.476 -1.887
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.064 0.208 0.000 0.059
Table 6: GMM estimation of the dynamic model. Normalisation made with
the labour force
The results from the comparisons in this section indicate that the earlier
studies on Swedish data might have overstated the displacement e¤ects from
labour market programmes (since the normalisation was made by the labour
force) and falsely rejected a dynamic model (since they used too few time
periods).
6.5 Sensitivity analysis
The main problem with our analysis of displacement, as we have stressed on
a number of occasions in this paper, is that we risk capturing the reaction of
policies to the labour market situation rather than the e¤ects of ALMPs on
employment. One way of checking our causal interpretation of the results is
to estimate our model in a context where we would not expect any serious
displacement e¤ects. More speci…cally, if there are practically no program
31participants in a sector, we would not expect any signi…cant crowding out.51
Thus, we estimate a labour demand equation for a sector where we know that
almost no program participants are located— manufacturing of machinery.52
If our estimates of this alternative model point to severe displacement e¤ects,
this would cast serious doubt on our interpretation of the baseline results.
The results for manufacturing of machinery are presented in Table 753.
A comparison between the results in Table 7 and the baseline results
presented in Table 2 are rather reassuring. Ideally, we would like to see no
displacement e¤ects from the ALMPs in manufacturing of machinery. This
is also in principle what we see. In particular, there is a dramatic change
in the estimated coe¢cient for OTHER PROGR.: the point estimate now
indicates virtually no crowding out and it is also statistically insigni…cant in
the …rst step. The coe¢cient for RELIEF WORK indicates some crowding
in, but the e¤ect is insigni…cant. The estimates of the e¤ects of TRAINING,
on the other hand, indicate signi…cant crowding in (with a point estimate
of approximately 0.18). A literal interpretation of this …nding could be that
training contributes to this sector by training people for it, which creates
more jobs by eliminating shortages of workers with certain quali…cations.
GMM1 GMM2
Variable Coe¤ SE t-ratio Coe¤ SE t-ratio
nt¡1 0.537 0.072 7.463 0.537 0.002 272.72
INCOMEt¡1 9.762e-04 4.746e-04 2.057 0.001 4.133e-05 23.332
RELIEF WORK 0.092 0.197 0.466 0.098 0.010 10.082
TRAINING 0.177 0.057 3.131 0.175 0.005 34.387
OTHER PROGR: -0.016 0.048 -0.333 -0.009 0.004 -2.409
DEMAND 0.009 0.014 0.640 0.009 0.001 7.356
Sargan(1) AR(1) AR(2) Sargan(2) AR(1) AR(2)
Test 366.14 -3.305 0.697 227.03 -3.605 0.701
p-value 0.0000 0.001 0.486 0.4309 0.000 0.483
Table 7: GMM estimation of the dynamic model with employment in man-
ufacturing of machinery as dependent variable
51There may, of course, be indirect e¤ects from programme participants in other sectors,
but we expect these to be second-order e¤ects.
52This way of strengthening (or weakening) the case for a causal interpretation is dis-
cussed in Angrist and Krueger (1998).
53The set of instruments includes political majority and tax equalising grants (both in
…rst-di¤erence form), n in manufacturing of machinery (in levels, lags 3-6); INCOME,
UNEMPLOYED, RELIEF WORK, TRAINING, OTHER PROGR., and DEMAND (in
levels, lags 1-6); the constant and the time dummies. See further the notes to Table 2
32While we believe the results in Table 7 to considerably con…rm our in-
terpretation of the baseline estimations, we will do some further sensitivity
analysis to investigate how sensitive the estimated displacement e¤ects are
to changes in the baseline model speci…cation (as given by equation (26)).
These results are presented in Table 8.54
First, it can be interesting to examine what happens if we normalise with
contemporaneous population instead of population lagged one period. This
is a problem related to inter-municipal migration. If the way people sort
themselves among the municipalities is a function of ALMPs, the contem-
poraneous population is endogenous and hence inappropriate to use when
normalising the regressors. One way of reducing this problem is to normalise
with lagged population, thereby making the denominator of the regressors
exogenous. When normalising with contemporaneous population, we see
from the results, presented in column I, that we get less displacement e¤ects
from relief work and more displacement e¤ects from training and the other
programmes.
Second, relating to the discussion in sections 3.2.2 and 3.2.3 about munic-
ipal labour demand, it might be worth trying tax equalising grants received
by the municipality, the demographic structure and the political situation in
the municipality as regressors in addition to the ones used in Table 2. These
results, presented in columns II-V, are very similar to our baseline estimates.
Third, what happens if we use contemporaneous income? From the re-
sults, presented in column VI, we note that not much is changed compared
to the baseline analysis.
Finally, what happens if we use lags on the right-hand side variables in
addition to the lagged dependent variable? The results, presented in column
VII, show displacement e¤ects similar to those in the baseline analysis.55
Overall, the sensitivity results in Table 8 indicate that our baseline re-
sults, presented in Table 2, are very robust to di¤erent model speci…cations.
OTHER PROGR. always has a signi…cant e¤ect, and the point estimates
indicate a displacement in the order of 50-80 percent (with 66 percent in the
54We could not reject the model speci…cations in any of the models presented in Table 8.
The full results are available upon request. Some notes to Table 8: (i) The reported
estimates are from the second step; (ii) an asterisk denotes a coe¢cient that is signi…cant
in both steps (at the 10% signi…cance level); (iii) The model speci…cations considered
are: I: Normalisation made with contemporaneous population; II: Controlling for the
demographic structure (fraction young and fraction old); III: Controlling for the political
situation; IV: Controlling for tax equalising grants; V: Controlling for the variables in II-IV
simultaneously; VI: Controlling for contemporaneous income; VII: Controlling for lagged
right-hand side variables in addition to the lagged dependent variable; (iv) For further
notes, see Table 2.
55The results presented are the short run dynamics.
33baseline case). RELIEF WORK displaces to the same extent as OTHER
PROGR., but does not always have a signi…cant e¤ect. TRAINING, …nally,
does not seem to (signi…cantly) displace any regular employment.
Variable I II III IV V VI VII
RELIEF WORK -0.349 -0.730* -0.635* -0.639* -0.736* -0.602 -0.523
TRAINING -0.362* -0.121 -0.159 -0.161 -0.114 -0.105 -0.184
OTHER PROGR: -0.759* -0.502* -0.657* -0.659* -0.493* -0.661* -0.822*
Table 8: Estimated displacement e¤ects under di¤erent model speci…cations
(comparisons to be made with the results in Table 2)
7 Conclusions
In this paper we set out to investigate the direct displacement e¤ects of ac-
tive labour market programmes (ALMPs). We use a panel of 260 Swedish
municipalities observed over a ten year period (1987-1996). Compared to
earlier studies, we use more years, which facilitates the identi…cation of any
potential dynamics, we cover the recession in the Swedish economy during
the …rst half of the 1990s, and we have more instruments (to ease the identi-
…cation of the parameter estimates) and more explanatory variables (to use
in the sensitivity analysis).
We have put down a lot of e¤orts to avoid the potential problems of si-
multaneity problems, measurement errors, time aggregation, and hiring and
…ring costs. We have, e.g., done so by using instrumental variables tech-
niques, dated the number of program participants (12-month average) to
the year preceding the month in which employment is measured (Novem-
ber), constructed a proxy for municipality-speci…c demand shocks, and used
dynamic speci…cations.
We extract three main conclusions from the analysis in this paper. First,
there are direct displacement e¤ects from those ALMPs that generates sub-
sidised labour, but there seems to be no (signi…cant) displacement e¤ects
from training. The displacement e¤ect from the “other programmes” (which
is the sum of persons enrolled in workplace induction, practice for immi-
grants and for college graduates, work experience schemes, trainee replace-
ment schemes, and youth programmes) is rather severe: 66 per cent according
to the baseline estimation. The displacement e¤ect from relief work is 64 per
cent in the baseline estimation, but this e¤ect is not as precisely measured
as that for the “other programmes”. Regarding the estimated displacement
34e¤ect from relief work, it can be noted that it is smaller than shown in ear-
lier studies. One potential explanation for this is that the number of persons
enrolled in relief work is lower in the period under study in this paper than
in periods analysed in most earlier studies.
Second, training and other labour market programmes increases labour
force participation, while it is less clear what e¤ects relief work has in this
respect. The logic behind this conclusion is as follows. If ALMPs in them-
selves increase labour force participation, we would, when normalising with
the labour force, by de…nition get parameter estimates of the ALMPs that
indicate more crowding out of regular employment than if the normalisation
was made with the population. That is, if we get more crowding out when
normalising with the labour force than when normalising with the population,
this is consistent with ALMPs actually increasing labour force participation.
And this is precisely what we …nd for training and other labour market pro-
grammes: the estimated coe¢cients are -0.81 compared to -0.16 for training
and -1.25 compared to -0.66 for the “other programmes”. The parameter es-
timate for relief work indicate crowding in, but insigni…cantly so. Of course,
this …nding is another possible explanation to why the estimated displace-
ment e¤ect from relief work is smaller than shown in earlier studies since the
earlier studies normalised with the labour force.
Even though the earlier studies normalised with the labour force, no dis-
cussion was made that a possible implication might be that labour force
participation was increased by the ALMPs: the parameter estimates were
only interpreted in terms of displacement e¤ects, implying that the earlier
studies overstated the displacement e¤ects from the programs. In conclusion,
if one is interested in the “pure” displacement e¤ects of ALMPs, one shall
normalise with the population.
Third, our results indicate a sluggish adjustment to the optimal level of
employment: the lagged dependent variable has a point estimate of 0.15
in the baseline estimation and is statistically signi…cant. This result di¤ers
from the earlier studies, since they found no dynamics. When estimating our
baseline model for the period used in Forslund (1996) and Sjöstrand (1997)
(i.e., 1990-1994), we found, in addition to a badly speci…ed model, no sign
of a dynamic adjustment. A tentative conclusion is hence that …ve years of
observations are not enough to properly identify a (dynamic) labour demand
function.
A detailed sensitivity analysis lead us to the impression that our baseline
estimates are very robust. In particular, when re-estimating our baseline
model with employment in a sector virtually without program participants
(manufacturing of machinery) as the dependent variable, we found no dis-
placement e¤ects from subsidised employment (i.e., from relief work and
35“other programmes”). This result considerably strengthened our belief that
the obtained baseline results are reliable.
Does our …nding of rather strong displacement e¤ects of subsidised em-
ployment imply that such programmes should be abandoned? Not necessar-
ily. Displacement of regular employment de…nitely is a cost that should be
considered when launching large-scale programmes, and care must of course
be taken to ensure that a minimum of crowding out takes place. The costs
must, however, be traded o¤ against potential bene…ts. Our results point to
one such bene…t: to the extent that programme participants are outsiders
with a very weak position in the labour market, it may very well be the case
that the alternative to programme participation is exit from the labour force
and perhaps, eventually, early retirement. To the extent that programmes
counteract this, we would de…nitely count that as a bene…t. Our …nding that
displacement as a fraction of the labour force is larger than as a fraction of
the population is consistent with a positive e¤ect of programmes on labour
force participation. More research is, however, needed to get a better grip of
the e¤ects of ALMPs in this respect.
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41A Summary statistics for the main variables
In this appendix we present some summary statistics for the main variables
in the analysis. We present descriptive statistics for the INCOME variable
in levels (and not for the square root of it, which is what is used in the
empirical analysis). The overall and within calculations use 260 ¤ 10 = 2600
observations. The between calculations use 260 observations. A variable xit
is decomposed into a between (¹ xi¢) component and a within (xit ¡ ¹ xi + ¹ x),
where ¹ x denotes the overall mean, component.
Variable Mean Std.Dev. Min. Max.
n Overall 15188.46 27004.1 1236 358393
Between 26954.5 1439.6 336245.3
Within 2278.6 -15821.8 37888.7
INCOME Overall 1341.22 287.8 760.2 2905.7
Between 135.3 1120.9 2192.6
Within 254.1 632.4 2054.3
RELIEF WORK Overall 48.5 86.8 0 1446.4
Between 79.3 2.7 719.4
Within 35.7 -337.1 775.5
TRAINING Overall 188.37 308.5 5.4 5780.7
Between 282.4 23.3 2739.5
Within 125.1 -959.3 3229.5
OTHER PROGR. Overall 175.68 385.7 0 6441.8
Between 239.6 15.5 2143.0
Within 301.7 -1925.3 4496.8
DEMAND Overall 15269.76 27204.9 1260.8 364620.3
Between 27148.7 1487.7 337922
Within 2368.2 -17036.2 41968.1
POPULATION Overall 31920 56059.9 3337 718462
Between 56133.3 3495.9 687303.7
Within 1635.7 11426.3 63078.3
Table 9: Summary statistics for the variables presented in Table 1 (variables
not normalised)
42Variable Mean Std.Dev. Min. Max.
n Overall .7819 .0801 .4781 .9773
Between .0401 .5912 .9021
Within .0694 .6531 .9028
RELIEF WORK Overall .0030 .0029 0 .0291
Between .0025 .0003 .0173
Within .0016 -.0098 .0149
TRAINING Overall .0112 .0068 .0013 .0620
Between .0055 .0021 .0413
Within .0041 -.0047 .0356
OTHER PROGR. Overall .0102 .0100 0 .0489
Between .0031 .0028 .0202
Within .0096 -.0090 .0391
DEMAND Overall .7864 .0740 .5188 .9752
Between .0338 .6102 .8904
Within .0658 .6697 .9327
Table 10: Summary statistics for the variables presented in Table 1 (variables
normalised with the lagged population aged 18-65)
43